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The purpose of this project was to determine
whether changing clinicians’ behaviors to reduce costs
in a large academic medical center is facilitated by the
prior existence of a total quality management program.
Ten teams, made up primarily of clinicians, were
charged with devising strategies for altering specific
clinical behaviors to reduce costs without detriment to
quality of care. Half the teams followed the center’s
total quality management approach. Team success was
assessed by how well three key tasks were completed:
problem definition, design of plan of action, and plan
implementation. Two teams achieved outright success-
es, three had outright failures, and five were in
between. Adherence to a total quality management
approach was not found to be associated with team suc-
cess. A much better predictor of success was the level
of involvement and support by clinicians and managers;
because that factor is largely controlled by institution-
al incentives, those incentives may need to be realigned
before the effectiveness of a total quality management
approach can be properly evaluated.
High cost care has long been a distinguishing feature
of academic medical centers and, increasingly in recent
times, its Achilles’ heel. Most efforts to deal with the
high cost care problem in academic medical centers
have emphasized organizational restructuring. By con-
trast, the work we describe addresses the problem
through changing clinical behaviors. We sought to
determine whether, in attempting to change those
behaviors, an institution’s previously established total
quality management program is a positive factor.
w
THE HIGH COST CRISIS IN ACADEMIC
MEDICAL CENTERS
As long as high costs of care were accepted-if not
welcomed-as a by-product of the unique mission and
role of the nation’s more than 120 academic medical cen-
ters, these institutions prospered. They were thus able to
continue their traditional emphasis on the provision of
sophisticated patient care, combined with heavy involve-
ment in medical research and the education of physi-
cians and other clinical professionals (1, 2). A decade
ago, however, high costs of care became a major con-
cern for academic medical centers, when their financial
well being was threatened by developments that included
Medicare’s implementation of the DRG-based prospective
payment system, along with major changes in the public
funding of medical schools (3).
Although in the end academic medical centers suc-
cessfully weathered the changes of the mid-1980s, they
now face another, similar crisis (1, 4). As managed care
organizations (MCOs) and other purchasers of care
move aggressively to ally themselves with low cost
providers, higher cost academic medical centers are
being left out of such arrangements, and therefore are
in danger of losing substantial numbers of patients-
and the income they represent-at the very time they
have come to depend as never before on patient rev-
enues (5). The Clinton plan and some other health care
reform plans proposed in 1994 would have largely
averted such losses, by making special provisions for
compensating teaching hospitals for their higher, edu-
cation-related costs, much as Medicare had done under
its prospective payment system. However, with the
demise of health care reform legislation in late 1994
and the subsequent movement to impose strict limits
on the growth of Medicare and Medicaid expenditures
for many years to come, academic medical centers
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have little choice but to deal directly with the threat
posed by their higher costs of care.
Restructuring as a Response
The strategies that have been adopted by some acad-
emic medical centers in response to the current threat,
and those that in the past have been urged on them by oth-
ers, all place heavy emphasis on reorganization and
restructuring (6-9). Although this is not always explicitly
stated, a major purpose of many of these restructuring
proposals is to better align the goals and operations of the
major constituent elements of the contemporary acade-
mic medical center: the medical school, its affiliated hos-
pitals, and the faculty practice plan. Such proposals also
reflect a general preoccupation with finding optimal ways
for properly configuring the complex web of relation-
ships that characterize academic medical centers within
and outside their own confines.
Changing Clinical Behaviors as a Response
In contrast to such restructuring solutions, the work
we describe focuses on how to ensure, as part of an
overall strategy for reducing the costs of care in acade-
mic medical centers, that clinicians actually adopt prac-
tices that result in lower costs without detriment to
quality. Our premise is that, if the goal is to reduce the
costs of care, then, no matter what else is done, success
will ultimately depend on whether clinicians adopt
approaches to the provision of care that result in fewer
resources being used while at the same time delivering
care that is as good as, or even better than, before.
On this issue, however, the literature is less specific
and the debate less well engaged than on issues of
restructuring. Most of what has been written deals pri-
marily with what, in general, needs to be done in this
area and about overall goals, as typified by this state-
ment : &dquo;The academic medical centers should not be
permitted to use educational goals as an excuse not to
deal with inefficiencies and excessive costs ... They
will have to minimize the cost of their most complex
and specialized care without sacrificing quality&dquo; (1). In
contrast, the discussion of strategies for actually
reaching such goals is typically generic and indirect,
with only a relatively few exceptions, notably the
description of the program instituted by Strong
Memorial Hospital in Rochester, New York, which
attempted to capitalize on, rather than work against,
the special culture and incentives of academic medical
centers (10).
The Clinical Efficiency Initiative
The effort described here-to which we refer as the
clinical efficiency initiative (CEI)-sought to define an
explicit strategy for reducing costs that focuses on
changing clinical behaviors. It builds on an earlier pro-
gram that was tested at three community teaching hos-
pitals. That program achieved relatively good success
in both enlisting clinician cooperation and changing
physicians’ clinical behaviors. Where failures occurred,
most of them were attributable-somewhat to the sur-
prise of those who formulated the strategy-to a lack
of resolve on the part of management and instances in
which clinicians’ initiatives and actions were not prop-
erly supported by managerial actions (11).
At the academic medical center at which the new
strategy was tested, such management-related prob-
lems were expected to be substantially less likely to
occur, in large part because hospital management at
the medical center had already made a strong commit-
ment to a total quality management (TQM) agenda, and
was actively seeking to include within TQM a wider
spectrum of clinical activities. What follows reports on
the extent to which those expectations proved to be
well founded.
METHODS
The project site is a large academic medical center
in the Midwest that in 1991, when the CEI began, had a
total of almost 900 inpatient beds and employed over
11,000 people, of whom more than 700 were physicians
and other faculty. The medical center enrolled over
1,500 medical students, residents, fellows, and other
graduate students. Its faculty and staff were providing
over 700,000 patient visits per year, and its research fac-
ulty received close to $100 million in grants per year.
The faculty practice plan was generating over $230 mil-
lion in gross annual revenues.
In the 5 years before the start of the CEI, hospital
management at the medical center had implemented a
nationally recognized total quality management pro-
gram, primarily in its administrative and support ser-
vices areas. By 1991 the medical center’s leadership
believed the institution’s experience and success with
TQM in nonclinical areas placed it in a strong position
to extend TQM principles to the center’s core clinical
activities, as many in the field were urging be done and
as the medical center’s leaders themselves believed
they would have to do to achieve higher quality and effi-
ciency of care (12-14).
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Key Features of the Approach
A lead team was established for the CEI consisting
of physicians, nurses, and managers; physicians were
in the majority on the team. The CEI lead team was
charged by the dean of the medical school and the hos-
pital’s chief executive officer with identifying specific
issues to be addressed by the CEI, selecting teams to
address them, and providing a central point for the
assessment and support of all CEI efforts.
The first six issues identified by the lead team in 1991 1
and 1992 are listed in Table 1. The six issues were selected
from a longer list generated earlier in 1991 by the chairs
of the clinical departments at a retreat at which they had
brainstormed about clinical problems and issues that
ought to be addressed at the medical center. In making
its selection, the lead team relied on a set of explicit cri-
teria that included: potential clinical and financial impact
of addressing the issue successfully; extent to which at
least one respected clinician is available to lead the effort
on the issue; extent of consensus as to what constitutes
optimal management of the clinical aspects of the issue;
overall probability of successfully addressing the issue;
availability of relevant data; and estimate of the time
required to resolve the issue.
A total. of 10 issues were addressed between 1991
and 1993 under the aegis of the CEI. They are listed in
Table 1. As shown in that table, the efforts directed at
the 10 issues were organized in terms of either a 7-step
process, a 3-step process, or a combination of the two,
which we call the hybrid process. The different
approaches were used because, as part of the CEI, the
7-step process was to be compared with the 3-step
process to determine which is more effective in achiev-
ing changes in clinical behaviors.
The 7-step process incorporates most of the features
of TQM approaches that by 1991 had already been
implemented in several areas of the medical center. By
contrast, as described below, the design of the 3-step
process was based on other concepts and approaches.
Experience with the two processes led the project team
to the conclusion that combining the features of the
two may be best; hence the adoption of the hybrid
process for the issues addressed in the latter part of the
project. Although in broad concept the 7-step process
and the 3-step process share some similarities, they
nevertheless differ in several respects.
The 3-step process was originally devised for the
project mentioned earlier that sought to enlist clinician
cooperation to improve quality and efficiency at three
Table 1
Basic characteristics of the ten teams
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community teaching hospitals (11). This approach
traces its roots to the work of Williamson et al. (15) and
Eisenberg (16). Its three steps are:
1. Examine the evidence relevant to the problem being
addressed and, in light of that evidence, specify the
approach to be taken in carrying out the team’s charge.
2. Design a detailed strategy for implementing the
approach that includes:
a. A statement of the clinical criteria and standards
that underlie the team’s approach.
b. A plan for implementing the strategy, consisting of:
-an educational component, and
-a procedure to assure and continually reinforce
adherence to the new clinical behaviors.
3. Review the results of the initial implementation and,
if necessary, modify the strategy to achieve desired
outcomes.
The 7-step process is derived from work done original-
ly at Florida Power and Light (17). It is one of many ver-
sions of the basic strategies developed by TQM pioneers
W Edwards Deming and James M. Juran that hospitals
have adopted in recent years (18, 19). The seven steps are:
1. Identify a theme or problem area and the reason for
working on it.
2. Select a problem and set a target for improvement.
3. Identify and verify the root causes of the problem.
4. Plan and implement countermeasures that will cor-
rect the root causes of the problem.
5. Confirm that the problem and its root causes have
been decreased.
6. Standardize to prevent the problem and its root
causes from recurring.
7. Plan what to do about any remaining problems,
determine how to replicate the countermeasures
elsewhere, and evaluate the team’s effectiveness.
In an effort to be flexible in applying TQM concepts
and approaches to clinicians, teams following the 7-
step process did not necessarily adhere to all the ways
in which such a TQM-associated strategy would have
been carried out elsewhere in the medical center. On
the other hand, a few selected TQM techniques were
used as part of the 3-step process.
Table 2 lists the specific characteristics on which the
3-step and 7-step processes differ. Teams using the 7-
step process hewed for the most part to procedures that
have become associated with TQM, such as having a
team leader who has been through special team leader
training, and holding meetings at regular intervals, usu-
ally weekly. They also made use of the full complement
of analytic and other tools associated with TQM.
In contrast, the teams using the 3-step process fol-
lowed a design intended to minimize the burden on physi-
cians and other clinicians while still ensuring that they
actively participate in all key decisions; hence the empha-
sis in the 3-step process on holding as few meetings as
possible, and on relying heavily on staff for data collec-
tion and analysis activities. The only TQM-associated
tools used consistently in the 3-step process were flow-
charting and brainstorming, because flowcharting could
be done by specially trained staff, and brainstorming
could be taught to the teams on the spot, as needed.
As reflected in Table 2, the hybrid process is an
amalgam of the two other processes. It relies on many
more TQM tools and techniques than the 3-step
Table 2
Key Distinctions among Types of Teams
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process, while at the same time it places greater
reliance on staff and has a meeting schedule that is
more flexible than that of the 7-step process.
Analysis Strategy
We assessed the extent t6 which the 10 teams suc-
cessfully completed three key sequential stages implicit
both in the 3-step process and the 7-step process: prob-
lem definition, design of a plan of action, and plan imple-
mentation. As shown in Figure 1, we define four possible
outcomes for each team’s efforts in relation to the three
stages. Failure occurs when a team never gets past the
stage of attempting to specify precisely the problem it
should address. When a team successfully defines a prob-
lem but does not generate a plan for dealing with it, the
result is defined as nearfailure. An zcrtreaLized success
refers to the situation where a team specifies a plan of
Fig. 1. Definition of team success in relation to key
tasks.
action but the plan is never implemented. To achieve
success, a team must have completed all three stages
specified in Figure 1, including plan implementation.
RESULTS
Total Quality Management
Based on the criteria just described, the work of the
10 teams was assessed. As shown in Table 3, the teams
are evenly divided across the four possible outcomes,
with two or three teams in each column. When successes
and failures are examined in terms of whether adher-
ence to TQM procedures made a difference, no clear pat-
tern emerges. Teams following the 3-step process, which
had the least TQM content, are spread across all four
outcome categories, as are the teams that followed
processes that had substantially higher TQM content,
the 7-step process and the hybrid process (Table 4).
Clinicians’ and Managers’ Involvement and
Support
Because reliance on TQM approaches was found not
to be associated with the pattern of teams’ success and
failure, we sought to determine what accounted for it.
Table 3
Classification of Teams in Relation to Success and
Failure Categories
Table 4
Degree of Success of 3-Step Teams versus
Other Teams
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Based on previous work and our own observations dur-
ing this project, we identified as a likely factor the
extent to which key clinicians and managers were
actively involved in and supportive of the efforts of
individual teams.
We distinguished clinicians from managers by the
roles they play, rather than being guided strictly by
their credentials or training. We define as clinicians
those who relate to the work of the teams as care-
givers ; put another way, these are the individuals
whose clinical behaviors the teams sought to alter. By
contrast, managers are all those whose most impor-
tant relation to the work of a team is in terms of their
ability to deploy, allocate, and assign resources. By
that definition, we count as part of management not
only professional managers, but we also include
physicians who by virtue of being clinical department
chiefs control the personnel and other organizational
resources that are key to a team’s development and
implementation of a plan.
We evaluated, for each team, the extent to which
clinicians and managers who either were on a team or
had to work closely with the team became involved in
the work of the team and provided material and moral
support to the team’s efforts. For clinicians., we exam-
ined : key clinicians’ record of attendance at team meet-
ings ; whether there was at least one &dquo;influential clini-
cian&dquo; who was willing to lend his or her time and
attention to the team’s work; willingness of &dquo;influential&dquo;
as well as other clinicians to advocate, vis-a-vis their
professional colleagues, changes in clinical practices,
in accordance with their teams’ recommendations.
Similarly, for marcagers, we examined: extent to which
the staff support provided by management to a team
was adequate to the task, in terms of both availability
and skills; and extent to which managers were willing
and able to provide the resources and the political sup-
port and to make the changes that were necessary for
implementing a team’s plan of action.
Although when so defined our concept of clinicians’
and managers’ support for teams is not subject to pre-
cise quantification, we found that for each team we
could characterize relatively readily the overall support
by clinicians and by managers as either strong or weak.
Such a dichotomized measure of support, when-related
to team success, yielded results that were consistent
with our initial expectations. For example, team suc-
cess was found to be associated with strong support
from clinicians.
However, the most striking relationships emerge
when the support of clinicians and that of managers are
considered simultaneously: they jointly account for all
four types of outcomes (Table 5). As might be expect-
Table 5
Relation between Team Success and Level of
Support Provided by Clinicians and Managers
ed, successes are achieved when both clinicians’ and
managers’ support is strong. Conversely, failures occurs
when the support from both clinicians and manage-
ment is weak. On the other hand, unrealized successes
result when a plan was formulated with the strong sup-
port of clinicians, but the necessary resources were not
brought to bear on it by managers, leaving the plan
unimplemented. Near failures, on the other hand,
occur when no plan emerges from the effort for lack of
sufficient clinician involvement and commitment, even
though managers’ support is strong.
DISCUSSION
Our results are likely to disappoint anyone harboring
the expectation that through TQM alone the high cost
problems faced by academic medical centers will be
resolved. In the CEI, use of TQM approaches was not
consistently associated with success: the five teams that
relied on the approaches most closely tied to TQM did not
achieve a pattern of success much different from the five
teams relying on other approaches. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, among both kinds of teams, only one in five
achieved success as we defined it (see Table 4).
Similarly, contrary to initial expectations, the project
site’s nationally recognized TQM program and its stated
commitment to making necessary changes in order to
achieve higher quality and efficiency did not translate
into invariably strong managerial support for all 10
teams. In fact, managers provided strong support at a
rate somewhat below that of the medical center’s clini-
cians (4 versus 5 out of 10), even though, a priori, the
clinicians were not expected to devote much of their
time or resources to this type of endeavor. Both groups
lent their strong support to teams only about half the
time, and both groups did not necessarily strongly sup-
port the same teams (Table 5).
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However, merely because TQM did not meet the exact-
ing standard of being all-conquering does not mean that
TQM was ineffectual, or worse. On the contrary, it could be
argued that the site institution’s experience with and com-
mitment to TQM was a positive factor in achieving such
successes as the CEI experienced. But bolstering that argu-
ment with solid proof would require a different study, one
with a more rigorous and elaborate research design.
Role of TQM
Within the scope of this project, the following can be
stated about the role of TQM, based on our observa-
tions and the results obtained:
~ The problems that led to a lack of success for
several teams had less to do with the relative
strengths and weaknesses of TQM than with such
factors as what the team was asked to do at the
outset. Too often the statement of the problem or
issue that was given to the team to address proved
frustratingly vague or far too broad.
~ The extent of clinician support may be overstated
in the data in Table 5, and, conversely, that of
management may be understated, due to differing
prior expectations: the design of the CEI was molded
by the view that clinicians would be reluctant
participants, but that managers would assume the
role of enthusiastic cheerleaders and facilitators.
The classification of teams in Table 5 can be inter-
preted as reflecting the extent to which teams met
or did not meet those unequal expectations, as
opposed to relating to a more absolute, common
standard. Thus the reported results may well
understate the support and accomplishments of
managers and, for similar reasons, the positive
contributions of TQM tools and techniques.
Other Observations and Conclusions
The CEI, in addition to its implications for the role
and value of TQM in this kind of endeavor, points to
other observations and conclusions:
· The common presumption that physicians and
other clinicians are likely to resist anything
related to TQM was not borne out in this instance.
Teams that hewed closely to TQM approaches
were just as successful-and unsuccessful-as
those that did not (see Table 4). Moreover, two
techniques currently closely associated with TQM,
brainstorming and flowcharting, were used by all
teams (see Table 2). Not only was there essen-
tially no resistance to the two techniques by
clinicians, but almost all clinicians involved in the
CEI readily accepted them and many, in fact,
found them to be useful.
· Even at its best, a well established TQM program
may not be enough to guarantee that managers will
muster the resources and political will that are
necessary to support efforts to increase the
efficiency of clinical activities. The results from the
CEI suggest that an active TQM program may not
necessarily impel managers to perceive fully their
own need to contend with often difficult and
painful change whenever efforts are made to have
clinicians alter their clinical behaviors.
· The CEI showed once again an important though
unsurprising verity: clinicians’ support is crucial to
successfully move in the direction of greater
efficiency in clinical activities. In this regard, we
also observed at this one academic medical center
something that is apt to be true at most such
centers: the members of the medical faculty all too
often are given, individually and collectively, few
organizational incentives to work on improving the
efficiency of care. Their chief rewards still come
almost exclusively from publishing and obtaining
research grants. How true this is, of course, varies
across clinical departments, but until and unless the
overall pattern of incentives is changed, most of the
clinicians who actively support efforts like the CEI
will do so almost invariably despite of the prevailing
reward structure. This is an issue for which embracing
TQM approaches at the institutional level is
unlikely, by itself, to be the solution.
Therefore, to the extent that a major restructuring
of an academic medical center actually helps
address the crucial question of incentives for clini-
cians-as well as for managers-the traditional
emphasis on restructuring as a solution may well be
justified. Thus the financial merger of the hospital
with the medical school, something several of these
institutions have recently done (20), may be an
important step forward, even if it is not the panacea
for all cost and quality problems that some may hope
it to be.
Our experience with the CEI suggests that efforts to
change clinicians’ behaviors in an academic medical cen-
ter may indeed be helped by institutional commitment
to TQM and by having a successful TQM program in place.
At the very least, those features are more likely to be a
help than a hindrance. But with or without TQM, the key
to success in this area appears to be where it has always
been: (a) in managers’ commitment to change and their
ability and willingness to fight for change, and (b) in
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whether incentives-for clinicians and everyone else
involved-are aligned so that improvements in the effi-
ciency of care are appropriately rewarded. Only after
those are properly addressed do questions of approach
really matter, and only then the merits and the appro-
priate role of TQM and related approaches become truly
relevant and can be studied meaningfully.
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